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Abstract
Informal family care presents important difficulties for the entire economy. Be-
cause of short supplies of formal elderly care, some family members are compelled to
leave work to provide care for elderly relatives. Therefore, the overall loss of added
value caused by informal family care is not negligible. After developing a model to
assess how households determine allocation of formal and informal elderly care, we
analyze subsidy effects for elderly care in the economy. Results show that subsidies
for formal care that is bought by people of the younger generation are more effective
for decreasing losses attributable to informal elderly care.
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1 Introduction
In some economically developed countries, an aging society with fewer children is progress-
ing. Elderly care has come to be an important difficulty. Because of elderly care, some
working people are compelled to quit their jobs. If elderly care provided by the market is
obtainable, then working people need not stop working. The aim of the analyses described
herein is development of a model in which family members determine how to provide for-
mal and informal elderly care and analysis of elderly care subsidy. Furthermore, some
policy implications might be derived to mitigate the difficulties.
Although it is true to varying degrees, trends of increase in the elderly population,
defined as people aged 65 years and older, have been observed. Ratios of the elderly
population to the working age (15–64 years) population have also increased in some OECD
countries. The difficulty of determining who is responsible for elderly care is an important
issue confronted by many countries today.
Elderly care is usually provided in two ways: formal elderly care is supplied by market
services; informal elderly care is supplied by family members. However, dependence on
elderly care by family members raises an important concern. If the family breadwinner
must care for elderly parents, then that worker might be unable to earn wage income
and might therefore fall into poverty. By virtue of elderly care services provided in the
market, the poverty of working generations can be solved because the working generation
can continue working even if the parents need elderly care.
The United States has experienced a sharp increase in the elderly population as baby
boomers, people born during 1946–1964, have become older. If the supply of elderly care
does not keep up with demand, then elderly care can be expected to depend greatly on
contributions by family members. Chari et al. (2015) estimate that the opportunity costs
of informal elderly care in the US are about 522 billion dollars annually. Not only the US,
but also Japan, faces difficulties related to aging. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications in Japan reports that about a hundred thousand people are compelled
to stop working to provide informal elderly care every year. The total loss of value added
from work stoppage for elderly care is estimated as about 650 billion yen (6 billion dollars).
Traditionally in Japan, it is women who must quit their jobs and become homemakers
after marrying. Recently, however, many female workers continue working even after
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getting married. Therefore, the loss of future value from informal care is expected to
be greater than the value estimated by the ministry. These severe difficulties must be
resolved to mitigate their economic effects.
Several papers have described relevant studies for this topic. Lundholm and Ohls-
son (1998) consider the relation between female labor and quantity of formal care services.
They show that an increase in formal care raises the female labor supply but reduces their
wages. Tabata (2005) analyzes aging effects on economic growth in a model including only
formal care services. The model includes assumptions that formal care is bought by elder
people for their own use and that formal care is bought by children for their parents.
He concludes that aging negatively affects economic growth because of high elderly care
costs. In contrast to Tabata (2005), Mizushima (2009) sets a model with informal elderly
care. The aging society engenders a longer informal care time. Pestieau and Sato (2008)
and Miyazawa (2010) consider the effects of elderly care on the economy in which formal
and informal elderly cares are perfect substitutes. They find that elderly care should be
provided by formal care rather than by informal care. This setting is consistent with those
used for empirical studies, as described by Horioka et al. (2018). In addition, Canta et al.
(2016) consider the effects of elderly care on capital accumulation and economic growth,
reporting that public elderly care insurance can foster capital accumulation and can there-
fore positively affect economic growth. Kydland and Pretnar (2019) set an overlapping
generations model with two types of care and estimate future welfare costs. Yakita (2020)
provides a model that accounts for a situation in which informal family care is replaced
by formal care as the economy develops. All the related papers described above rely on
the assumption that elderly care is produced by, at most, two inputs.
In the real economy, elderly care comprises three components: formal care bought by
elderly people for their own use, by adult children for their parents, and informal care
provided by adult children. Fig. 1 presents shares of informal elderly care and formal
elderly care.
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.]
As shown in Fig. 1, care of these two types might not be substitutes. Different from
the early studies, we develop a model with these three types of inputs. We analyze formal
care subsidy effects on the economy, and find that, to maintain the labor supply, the
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government should provide subsidies for formal care purchased by adult children rather
than by elderly parents for their own use. Our model with three inputs for elderly care
obtains these interesting results.
The remainder of this paper consists of the following. Section 2 establishes the elderly
care model. Section 3 presents an examination of the dynamics and steady states of the
economy. Section 4 explains an analysis of subsidy effects on the economy. The final
section concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this model, individuals in the household live in young and old periods. The number of
households is assumed to be unity. There is no population growth. Younger individuals
care for consumption of their own and the level of elderly care for their parents during the








ut = α ln ct + β lnEt + (1− α− β) lnEt+1, (1)














Eq. (1) is the utility function, where ct stands for consumption and Et represents the
level of elderly care. It is assumed that elderly care service is not durable and that it
consists of three inputs: final goods bought by the older individual eot , those bought by
their children eyt , and the elderly care time provided by their children lt, as in eq. (2).
Here, Bt is the productivity parameter of elderly care; η is a constant.
1 Thereafter, for
the discussion presented in this paper, we define the final goods purchased by individuals
as formal care and define elderly care time as informal care. Equation (3) is the lifetime
budget constraint. Each young individual has a unit time, but divides the time into two
activities: working for the final goods sector and informal family care. Therefore, the
young individual earns (1 − lt)wt and allocates income among consumption, care goods
for his parents, and savings for the older period, where wt denotes the wage rate and rt
expresses the interest rate.
1Kydland and Pretnar (2019) set the home production function with goods and the informal elderly
care time. The function form is defined as Cobb–Douglas type, which is similar with our setting.
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α + β + (1− α− 2β)η
α + β + (1− α− β)η
eot , (6)
eot+1 =
(1− α− β)η(1 + rt+1)














where Yt represents the production of final goods, which are used for both consumption
and elderly care, Kt denotes the capital stock, and Lt ≡ (1− lt) signifies the labor supply.
Under the competitive economy, we obtain each factor price as












, which is At = a
1
1−θ kt. Then, the production function becomes
Yt = aKt. (8)
Under the production function (8), one can obtain the following rate of interest and the
wage rate as
1 + rt = aθ, (9)
wt = (1− θ)akt. (10)
3 Dynamics and Steady States
Having developed the model, we turn to consideration of the dynamics of the economy.








The equation above is the Euler equation of the opportunity cost of informal care. Sub-






The dynamics of the capital–labor ratio is
(1− lt+1)kt+1 = (1− lt)wt − ct − e
y
t .
Substituting (4), (9), and (10) into the equation above and using (11) yields
kt+1 = (1− θ)akt +


















The economy is characterized by equations (11), (12), and (13). For the following
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∆lt ≡ lt+1 − lt. Then, we derive the following equations from ∆xt = 0 and ∆lt = 0 as
lt =
β(1− η)[(1− θ)θa2 + (1− 2θ)axt − x
2
t ]








− (1− θ)a+ xt
]
. (15)
From (14) and (15), we obtain the steady state equilibrium of this economy.
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.]
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As shown in Fig. 2, we can obtain the unique stable steady state equilibrium. The
steady state values of xt and lt are
x∗t =
(1− θ)[(β − θ)η − αθ(1− η)]a
α(1− ηθ)− (1− η)θ + β(1 + θ − 2ηθ)
,
l∗t =
(1− η)[β − (1− α− β)θ]
α(1− ηθ)− (1− η)θ + β(1 + θ − 2ηθ)
.
In the case of Fig. 2, both formal elderly care and informal elderly care are actively
provided. Depending on the parametric condition, a steady state exists such that both
the levels of formal and informal elderly care are small.
Here, we consider the effects of population aging on the economy. As population aging
progresses, the relative preference for the elderly care increases. This increase corresponds
to lower α in our model. Lower α increases both formal and informal elderly care in a
steady state. This result is very intuitive.
4 Effects of an Elderly Care Subsidy
This section presents examination of how subsidies for elderly care affect the demand
for market elderly care services and family care. First, our explanation describes deriva-
tion of the effects of a subsidy for elderly care with comparative statics. After applying
comparative statics, the subsidy effect is simulated.
4.1 Qualitative analysis
In the subsidy model, the household budget constraint can be changed as shown below






where δ, and ϵ denote the subsidy rates for elderly care. It is assumed that the subsidies
are financed by the lump-sum taxation Tt.
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kt+1 = (1− θ)akt +
(θ − β)(1− η)− α(1− ηθ)
β(1− η)
altkt − Tt − (1− δ)e
y
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(1− θ)θa2kt + aθTt
}
.
It is assumed that Tt = τwt = τa(1− θ)kt, where 0 < τ < 1 denotes the tax rate. Then,
the government budget constraint is shown as presented below.



















[(θ − β)(1− η)− α(1− ηθ)]a
, (17)
where
L1 = β(1− η){(1− θ)θa
2 − τa(1− θ)[aθ + (1− ϵ)xt] + [(1− ϵ)(1− θ)− (1− δ)θ]axt
−(1− ϵ)(1− δ)x2t},
L2 = a{[α + β + (1− α− 2β)η](1− θ)θa− (1− ϵ)[(θ − β)(1− η)− α(1− ηθ)]xt}.
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From (16) and (17), we obtain the steady state equilibrium of the economy with a
subsidy for elderly care.
Next, we examine the subsidy effects on raising δ on lt and xt. An increase in δ
represents a subsidy for the market elderly care purchased by younger people. With a
small tax burden, we can present the following figure as an example.
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.]
As presented in the figure above, the subsidy for market elderly care purchased by
younger people shifts ∆lt = 0 downward. On the one hand, this shift reduces family care
time lt. On the other hand, ∆xt = 0 shifts upward. Therefore, to the degree that the
shift of ∆xt = 0 is small, the care time by children, lt, decreases.
[Insert Fig. 4 around here.]
Fig. 4 presents the case of a subsidy for market elderly care purchased by older people.
Given a certain parameter condition, one can obtain the figure shown above. In this case,
both ∆lt = 0 and ∆xt = 0 shift upward. Then, both formal care xt and informal care lt
increase. Results of these analyses suggest that the government should probably subsidize
the formal care bought by the younger generation.
Proposition With a small tax burden, the subsidy for younger generation is preferable
to one for older generation in order to decrease informal care.
4.2 Numerical analysis
This subsection presents a numerical analysis of the subsidy effects. We set the parameter
such that the annual income growth rate is 2%. As shown by the simulation of real business
cycle theory (RBC), we set 1− α − β = 0.7. Subsequently, we examine the two cases to
obtain the constraints above.
Case 1 The parameters are set as a = 6.2, α = 0.5, β = 0.2, η = 0.659, θ = 0.3, ϕ = 0.1.
The policy function is defined as δt = ϕδt−1+ f , which f denotes the policy shocks. Also,
ϕ denotes the continuation of the policy. η is given by Kydland and Pretnar (2019). This
parameter set derives that the annual income growth rate is 2%. Considering the period
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of the overlapping generations model as 30 years, the income growth rate g was given as
0.8 at this parameter set.
The impulse of the policy shock of the subsidy for the formal elderly care purchased
by younger people is shown by the following.
[Insert Fig. 5(a) around here.]
Moreover, we examine the case of a subsidy for formal care to be purchased by older
people.
[Insert Fig. 5(b) around here.]
These results are straightforward. The subsidy raises demand for formal elderly care.
The younger people reduce the purchase for formal elderly care if the subsidy for formal
elderly care purchased by the older people is provided. This is the substitution effect.
However, the informal elderly care increases. This result is attributed to the complemen-
tary between formal and informal care. Then, the labor supply can decline over time.
Even if the parameter values are changed as Case 2, a = 3.1, α = 0.6, β = 0.1, η =
0.659, θ = 0.3, ϕ = 0.1, the results do not change appreciably. This case shows a decrease
in the preference for elderly care for parents.2
[Insert Fig. 6(a, b) around here]
5 Conclusions
For this study, we develop an overlapping generations model in which people of the young
generation care not only for themselves, but also for their parents. Elderly care consists of
care goods or services bought by people of both old and young generations plus informal
care time supplied by the young generation. Our analyses can derive the equilibrium in
the model with both formal and informal elderly care. Based on our model, we examine
population aging effects on both formal and informal elderly care. Population aging
pulls up not only formal elderly care but also informal elderly care. Then, because of
an increase in informal elderly care, the labor supply decreases. In many economically
developed countries, population aging is progressing quickly. Demand for both formal
2However, we set a = 3.1 to avoid changing the income growth rate.
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and informal elderly care is increasing. The results presented herein are consistent with
those found for actual economies all over the world.
In addition to the analysis of population aging, we examine the effects of subsidies
for formal elderly care on both formal and informal elderly care. By virtue of a subsidy
for formal elderly care purchased by older people, both formal elderly care and informal
elderly care increase. In contrast, when commencing a subsidy for elderly care purchased
by younger people, the subsidy raises the amount of formal elderly care provided but
reduces informal elderly care. As demonstrated by this result, the subsidy for formal
elderly care purchased by people of the younger generation is more effective than that for
people of the older generation for mitigating the effects of a decrease in the labor supply.
Therefore, the government should provide a subsidy for formal elderly care purchased by
younger people to reduce the loss of value added resulting from informal care. Subsidies of
this type can resolve severe difficulties confronting many economically advanced countries.
As described in this paper, we particularly examined subsidy effects on the quantity of
formal elderly care and the time for informal elderly care. We do not consider the policy
for social welfare. We expect to undertake social welfare analysis in future work.
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Fig. 1 Share of Informal Cares and Formal Carers. 
(Data: OECD Data “Health as a Glance 2019: OECD Indicators” and “Long-term care workforce: caring 
















Fig. 5(a) Subsidy for formal elderly care purchased by younger people (Case 1). 
The left panel shows the change of the level of formal elderly care purchased by younger people. The right 
panel shows the change of informal elderly care. 
 
 
Fig. 5(b) Subsidy for formal elderly care purchased by older people (Case 1). 
The left panel shows the change of the level of formal elderly care purchased by younger people. The right 




Fig. 6(a) Subsidy for formal elderly care purchased by younger people (Case 2). 
The left panel shows the change of the level of formal elderly care purchased by younger people. The right 
panel shows the change of informal elderly care. 
 
 
Fig. 6(b) Subsidy for formal elderly care purchased by older people (Case 2). 
The left panel shows the change of the level of formal elderly care purchased by younger people. The right 
panel shows the change of informal elderly care. 
 
